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In the critical moments of an operation, the collapse of tactical communications can derail the mission - or end lives. While primary systems are planned with precision, too often the failure of alternate, contingency and emergency layers exposes a brittle communications plan. This is where the PACE methodology - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency - should provide assurance. But in practice, it often fails to deliver.

Here’s why.

The planning problem: too much focus on Primary systems

Command and Control communications are notoriously complex to implement - especially in infrastructure-poor environments. Military forces must coordinate voice, data and situational awareness across a range of users, from frontline fighters to logistics teams, in ever-changing terrain and threat conditions. Tactical planning must account for a wide range of factors:

• Frequency selection
• Path profile and range
• Terrain and atmospheric conditions
• Encryption and terminal allocation
• Enemy activity and jamming threats

Yet despite the detail involved, planning often assumes the Primary system will carry most of the load. Typically a robust, encrypted VHF/UHF radio or tactical satellite system, this Primary layer is routinely heavy, complex and often slow to deploy. Its effectiveness is highly dependent on line-of-sight, training and equipment availability - and is vulnerable to physical and electronic disruption.

Even in the simplest scenarios, deploying Primary systems can take months of advance planning. One of the biggest constraints with VHF/UHF radios used in a line-of-sight role is range - typically just 20 to 40 miles in normal, undulating terrain. Extending this range requires the use of rebroadcast stations, which adds further complexity to the communications plan. Many operations cover hundreds - even thousands - of miles, making large-scale rebroadcast infrastructure essential. Mobile Adhoc network radio systems provide some level of extension but in most defence organisations these systems sit outside the budget limit.

The Alternate system: downgraded capability, complex set-up

When the Primary fails, the Alternate system is meant to step in. Often this is a High Frequency (HF) radio, which offers greater range and some resilience to terrain.

But HF brings its own challenges:

• Antennas may need to be lengthened manually
• Atmospheric conditions and time of day can affect propagation
• Bandwidth drops significantly, limiting data transfer
• Situational awareness feeds may be lost entirely

HF links require skilled operators and continuous engineering effort. Even with features like automatic link establishment and electronic antenna adjustment, maintaining a reliable HF connection is far from guaranteed - particularly over longer distances or in difficult environments.

The Contingency gap: mobile phones masquerading as military tools

In too many cases, the Contingency solution is a mobile phone - often used unofficially even during exercises. Easy, familiar and effective in training environments, it masks the absence of a true third-tier comms system.

Mobile phones also become embedded throughout the planning cycle - used to engineer Primary and Alternate links, coordinate logistics and manage admin. Their convenience distorts expectations, leading to an overreliance on fragile infrastructure. What starts as a practical workaround becomes a dangerous assumption - one that unravels in real-world conditions.

In exercises, mobile phones are everywhere. But this creates a false sense of capability. Once deployed into contested environments, the illusion falls apart: no coverage, no resilience, no security.

But in operational settings - conflict zones, jungles, deserts, remote terrain - coverage may not exist. And even if it does, mobile networks introduce serious vulnerabilities:

• Zero encryption
• High susceptibility to interception
• Dependence on fragile infrastructure
• Susceptible to tracking (via network triangulation or GPS) by a hostile actor

Using a mobile phone as a fallback is a false comfort. It introduces risk precisely when resilience is needed most.

The Emergency layer: often ignored until it’s too late

If Contingency fails, the Emergency tier is the final hope. Yet many forces do not equip users with dedicated emergency systems beyond a basic satellite phone or, in some cases, a distress beacon.

This represents a cliff-edge in capability - and a systemic failure to treat emergency communication as a core part of mission planning. The Emergency layer should provide a final line of contact, not a last resort powered by luck.

PACE isn’t broken. It needs rethinking.

The PACE model was designed to offer layered resilience in communications. But it only works if each layer is given real attention - and real investment.

In practice, many organisations build strong Primary systems, accept degraded Alternates, and rely on questionable Contingency and Emergency solutions. That leaves personnel exposed in the very moments when reliable comms matter most.

One way to strengthen these lower tiers - particularly Contingency and Emergency - is by integrating a lightweight, globally connected system like Bracer. Built around Iridium Push-to-Talk, Bracer delivers secure voice and positional data from virtually anywhere, with no reliance on existing infrastructure. It can be deployed rapidly as a fallback or even serve as the Primary system for early-entry teams and small units operating at reach.

PACE still holds value but only if all four layers are treated as mission-critical – and equipped accordingly.

Tim Williams is a former senior military communications specialist with extensive operational leadership. Now Business Development Manager at QinetiQ, he helps defence users strengthen tactical comms under pressure.